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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
would then adhere to stare decisis and follow its present
holding, or whether it might not then overrule the instant
case and line Maryland up with the Federal and other State
Courts decisions by holding that the dismissal of a third-
party complaint is not a final order and hence not directly
appealable? Or, in light of the fact that under the circum-
stances of the instant case, the dismissal of the third-party
complaint really had only a practical as distinguished from
a legal finality, it might be desirable for the Court of
Appeals to exercise its rule making power and remove the
conflict between the Maryland and Federal cases.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF ORAL CONTRACT TO
DEVISE REAL PROPERTY - RENDITION
OF PERSONAL SERVICES AS
PART PERFORMANCE
Shives v. Borgman
A bill was brought for specific performance of an alleged
oral contract to convey real and personal property. Plaintiff
was the former housekeeper of the decedent, while the
defendant was his administrator and heir at law. Plaintiff
claimed that from 1931 until 1936 she, with her son, lived
at the home of the decedent, keeping house for him, and
performing services for which she received compensation;
that she then left the employment of the decedent; that in
1946 she and her husband visited decedent, at his request,
and that in the course of the conversation decedent prom-
ised plaintiff that if she would return and care for him until
his death, he would leave her all his property, real and
personal; that plaintiff accepted this offer and with her
husband and son did return and care for the decedent until
his death, without receiving any compensation whatever.
Decedent died intestate a year and four months after the
plaintiff had resumed her employment with him.
The lower court held that the plaintiff and decedent,
"entered into a valid and enforceable contract by which
the decedent agreed to will his entire estate to complain-
ant", and as such the administrator was ordered to dis-
tribute the personal estate to her and a trustee was
appointed to convey the real estate to her.
169 A. 2d 802 (Md. 1949).
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The Court of Appeals affirmed, saying:
"We recognize that a court of equity should never
be anxious to save an oral contract, especially a con-
tract of this particular kind, from the operation of the
Statute of Frauds where there is any equivocation or
uncertainty in the evidence. The terms of the contract
must be clear and definite and must be affirmatively
established by strong and convincing evidence. The
acts performed by the complainant should also be clear
and definite and solely with a view to the performance
of the alleged contract."
But, the Court said:
"It is also well established that a court of equity
will specifically enforce an oral agreement to devise
real estate, although the agreement is within the
Statute of Frauds where the promisee has fully per-
formed his part of the agreement by rendering services
whose value cannot be estimated in terms of money,
and a monetary award will not place the parties in
statu quo or adequately compensate the promisee."
The doctrine of part performance is almost as old as
the Statute of Frauds itself, the first case to apply it having
been decided within ten years after the enactment of the
statute.2 It presents an anomaly, in that it permits what
IButcher v. Stapely, 1 Vern. 363, 23 Eng. Rep. 524 (1685). There has been
much conflict, especially in academic circles, regarding the basic theory of
the doctrine of part performance. It has been argued persuasively that the
Statute of Frauds was not intended to be applicable to proceedings in equity.
Costigan, Judicial Legislation in the Interpretation of the Statute of Frauds
(1919), 14 Ill. L. Rev. 1, pointing out that prior to the enactment of the
Statute, equity had required either writing or part performance by delivery
of possession before granting specific performance of a contract to convey
land. This conclusion is criticized in Pound, Progress of the Law, 33 Harv.
L. Rev. 929, 933, et 8eq. (1920), where it is contended that shortly after the
Statute of Frauds equity allowed specific performance of an oral contract.
if possession were shown, on the theory that this constituted livery of
selsin as a common law conveyance. Dean Pound calls the doctrine a "his-
torical anomaly, only to be understood by reference to 17th and 18th cen-
tury legal institutions and modes of thought in equity. . . . (It) defies
logically satisfactory analytical treatment."
In Maddison v. Alderson, 8 App. Cas. 467, 475 (1883), Lord Selborne
reasoned:
"... the defendant is really 'charged' upon the equities resulting from
the acts done in execution of the contract, and not (within the meaning
of the statute) upon the contract itself. If such equities were excluded,
injustice of a kind which the statute cannot be thought to have had in
contemplation would follow."
Dean Pound terms this:
"ex post facto rationalization of what had gone on in equity for his-
torical reasons.... The courts have not enforced and do not enforce
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the statute in terms prohibits; but it is based upon equitable
estoppel and fraud, on the theory that the promisor, having
permitted the promisee partially to perform and so alter
his position, should not be permitted to use the statute as a
defense and thereby perpetrate a fraud. The majority of
courts in this country and in England accept and apply
the doctrine.'
In View of the fact that equity is acting in the face of
a statute which expressly prohibits such court action,
strict rules as to the acts of part performance relied upon
have been developed in order to insure that there is
adherence to the spirit, if not the letter, of the statute.
It is generally held that the plaintiff must show that in
reliance upon the contract he has so moved to his detriment,
that he cannot be restored to his original position, this
being necessary to furnish the justification for equity's
disregard of the statute. In addition, he must also show
that his acts are such that they can be reasonably explained
only by the existence of the alleged contract, since only
so can the underlying policy of the statute be served. As
stated by Cardozo, J. in a leading case:
"Equity, in assuming what is in substance a dis-
pensing power, does not treat the statute as irrelevant,
nor ignore the warning altogether. It declines to act
on words, though the legal remedy is imperfect, unless
the equitable claims of the plaintiff arising from fraud or part per-
formance as such, but rather the contract Itself."
Progress of the Law, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 929, 936 (1920).
See also Kepner, Part Performance in Relation to Parol Contracts for
the Sale of Land, 35 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1950).
In a note dealing with the Doctrine of Part Performance in Suits for
Specific Performance of Parol Contracts to Convey Real Property, 101
A. L. R. 923, 935, it is stated:
"The true basis of the doctrine of part performance, according to the
overwhelming weight of authority, lies in principles of equitable es-
toppel and fraud; it would be a fraud upon the plaintiff if the defendant
were permitted to escape performance of his part of the oral agreement
after he has permitted the plaintiff to perform in reliance upon the
agreement."
Maryland has followed this theory. So, e.g., in Semmes v. Worthington,
38 Md. 298, 327 (1873), it is stated:
"The acts done must be of a substantial nature, and such, that the
party would suffer an injury amounting to a fraud by the refusal to
execute the agreement .... This is the ground upon which Courts of
Equity interpose their aid, in cases of clear part performance of verbal
agreements."
8Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee and North Carolina do not recognize
the doctrine. In Kentucky and North Carolina, the courts will give the
vendee a lien upon the land for the value of improvements placed there by
him, less the rental value of the land during the occupation. See cases cited
in Note, 101 A. L. R. 923, 944-948. Cf. Boehm v. Boehm, 182 Md. 254, 34 A.
2d 447 (1943) ; Green v. Drummond, 31 Md. 71 (1869).
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the words are confirmed and illuminated by deeds. A
power of dispensation, departing from the letter in
supposed adherence to the spirit, involves an assump-
tion of jurisdiction easily abused, and justified only
within the limits imposed by history and precedent.
The power is not exercised unless the policy of the law
is saved." 4
In Maryland the courts have vacillated from a rather
narrow and limited recognition of the doctrine, to cases
like the present which, it is submitted, have extended it
unduly. The doctrine was first recognized, although not
applied, in Worley v. Walling.' In that case a father was
alleged to have promised his daughter certain lands if she
would marry someone of whom he approved. After her
marriage, the father put the daughter and husband in pos-
session of land which they held and improved for ten years.
The Court recognized the doctrine of part performance but
refused to apply it, saying:
"Much stress has been laid on Walling's putting
the couple in possession after their marriage, as if this
could not be done, unless in pursuance of a former
engagement to make the daughter a tenant in fee
simple. But since the time of passing the acts relative
to deeds, no inference is to be drawn from the merely
suffering a man to take possession of land, except -that
he is to be a tenant at will."
Here there is applied strictly the basic rule limiting
the application of the doctrine, - the acts of part perform-
ance relied upon must be such as can be reasonably
explained only by the existence of the agreement alleged;
if the acts are such that another explanation is also possible,
they are not sufficient to remove the contract from the
statute.
The Court of Appeals has frequently reiterated this
principle. So, in Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company v.
Young," it said:
"Where the party claims to take the case out of the
Statute of Frauds, on the ground of part performance
of the contract, he must make out, by clear and satis-
factory proof the existence of the contract as laid in
'Burns v. McCormick, 23 N. Y. 230, 135 N. . 273, 274 (1922).
51 H. & J. 208, 210 (1801).0 3 Md. 480, 490 (185).
1951]
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the bill; the act of part performance must be of the
identical contract set up."
And in Semmes v. Worthington,7 where specific perform-
ance was refused of an oral contract to convey, allegedly
made in consideration for services which the plaintiff had
performed for his uncle, the court said:
"The act relied upon as part performance must, in
itself furnish evidence of the identity of the contract;
and it is not enough that it is evidence of some agree-
ment, but it must relate to and be unequivocal evidence
of the particular agreement charged in the bill."
Similar language is found in such recently decided cases
as Boehm v. Boehm,8 Kaufmann v. Adalman,9 and Serio v.
Von Nordeck.10
If this is to be regarded as the basic rule governing
the application of the doctrine of part performance, as the
Court of Appeals has from the beginning insisted, then it
seems obvious that acts of part performance which consist
entirely of the rendition of personal services to the alleged
promisor are insufficient to satisfy it. They furnish abso-
lutely no necessary indication of the existence of any con-
tract for the sale of land, let alone the particular contract
alleged, for they are reasonably explainable, not only on
the basis of the contract alleged, but as well on the basis
of a promise to pay money or to make a bequest of money
or chattels. Nothing points unequivocally to a contract to
leave land, or any particular land, and there is no exclusive
possession of the land claimed or the making of substantial
improvements thereon by the promisee, as normally
required to evidence such an agreement.1 Where the
services rendered are of an ordinary nature and as such
can be compensated for by damages at law there is of
course no justification in any event for granting specific
performance, since the promisee can recover the value
thereof on a quantum meruit. But even where the services
are unique, or the promisee is a relative or close friend of
the promisor and offers love, affection, society and friend-
ship above and beyond the ordinary services rendered,
such services, though incapable of measurement in terms
38 Md. 298, 326 (1873). Italics are the Court's.
'182 Md. 254, 25, 3 4 A. 2d 447, 452 (1943).
'186 Md. 639, 651, 47 A. 2d 755, 761 (1946).
"189 Md. 388, 392. 56 A. 2d 41, 42 (1947).
See Restatemen t. Con tracts, See. 197.
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of money, are, it is submitted, no more unequivocally
referable to a particular contract to leave particular land
than ordinary services and equally fail to satisfy the basic
rule as to the kind of part performance necessary to take
an oral contract out of the Statute of Frauds.
The Maryland decisions, which like the instant case
hold to the contrary, and regard rendition of unique services
as sufficient stem from the case of Neal v. Hamilton.12 In
that case plaintiff, stated by the Court to have been regarded
as a "natural grandchild" by the decedent, alleged a promise
by the decedent to leave her all his property, in reliance
upon which she left a job as a waitress, paying $35 to $55
per week, on which she supported her mother and herself.
She became the cook, housekeeper, nurse and companion
of the decedent for $12 a week plus room and board for
herself and her mother, taking care of him and giving him
her society and companionship. Decedent died intestate
within twenty-one months and the plaintiff sought specific
performance. The Court of Appeals granted specific per-
formance, saying:
"While the performance of ordinary services will
not take an oral contract out of the Statute of Frauds,
if the value of such services can be ascertained with
reasonable accuracy in an action at law, and adequately
compensated by a recovery of damages, yet where it
is impossible to restore the plaintiff to his original
position by any legal remedy, the essential condition
of equity jurisdiction in case of part performance is
fulfilled, and the rendition of the services will take
the parol contract out of the Statute of Frauds....
The promisor... craved companionship and affection,
and a comfortable home brightened by the presence
of the plaintiff. . . . The plaintiff dutifully supplied
what he sought, and it is impossible to estimate their
value to the intestate by any pecuniary standard."
The requirement, so frequently stated before and since,
that the acts of part performance relied upon must be
unequivocally referable not only to some contract but to
the very contract alleged, was practically ignored, the
Court saying merely:
"The acts of part performance are referable to, and
consistent with the contract alleged."
-159 Md. 447, 451, 150 A. 807, 869 (1930).
19511
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It is submitted that they were clearly equally referable
to, and consistent with, a promise to provide for the plain-
tiff by a cash bequest.
It would seem accordingly that the rule in Maryland
as to acts of part performance sufficient to take a parole
contract to convey or devise land out of the Statute of
Frauds must be stated as follows: - The acts of part per-
formance relied upon must be unequivocally referable, not
to some agreement, but to the particular agreement alleged,
except where such acts take the form of the rendition of
unique services in which case they need not be unequivo-
cally referable to the alleged agreement but only consistent
therewith.
Although many courts have adopted this exception to
the general doctrine of part performance,18 it is submitted
that it is both an illogical and an exceedingly dangerous
one. The ease with which fraudulent claims may be urged
upon the court is at once apparent. This type of case is,
indeed, an excellent example of what the Statute of Frauds
was designed to prevent. The mere fact that the promisor
in these cases is dead should alert the courts to the unlim-
ited possibilities of fraud. It is comparatively easy to allege
a promise never actually made, and comparatively difficult-
to disprove it. The reasons leading to the enactment of
the Statute of Frauds apply therefore with particular
force and it would seem that in consequence the rule
requiring acts to have been done which clearly and
unequivocally point to the contract alleged and can in no
other way be accounted for, should be particularly strongly
insisted upon. The Court of Appeals has in fact said only
recently, that in oral contracts to dispose of property by
will "the requirement as to part performance may perhaps
be more exacting than in cases of ordinary contracts of
sale."14
The Court of Appeals has, however, followed Neal v.
Hamilton, in two other cases prior to the instant case and
its holding must therefore be regarded as now firmly
established in Maryland. In Mannix v. Baumgardner,"
the plaintiff was the stepdaughter of the decedent. She
alleged a promise by the decedent that he would leave her
his entire estate, if she would care for him for the remainder
of his life. Specific performance was granted on the
See cases cited in Note, 101 A. L. R. 923, 1097 et seq.
u Serio v. Von Nordeck, 189 Md. 388, 392, 56 A. 2d 41, 42 (1947).
=184 Md. 600,42 A. 2d 124 (1945).
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authority of Neal v. Hamilton, the services being held
unique and not capable of compensation in money.
In Nichols v. Reed,16 the plaintiff had been reared as a
son in the home of the decedent. Plaintiff alleged a promise
to leave him certain land if plaintiff and his wife left their
home and employment and took care of decedent until his
death. Plaintiff complied, and cared for decedent from
1938 until 1941. At eighty years of age, the decedent told
plaintiff and his wife to leave the premises, in view of his
forthcoming marriage stating, however, that this would
not affect the agreement. Decedent married and died two
months later. The Court granted specific performance,
saying:
"Oral contracts to devise land are legal, if the
services constituting the consideration for the devise
are not ordinary services and are such services that
are classified as unique and peculiar services."
Even so, the instant case seems to carry the rule of
Neal v. Hamilton to an extreme point, for it was emphasized
in that case, and in those following it, that the services
relied upon as part performance must be peculiar and
unique and that rendition of ordinary services presented
no ground for granting equitable relief. In Neal v. Ham-
ilton, the plaintiff was the granddaughter of the promisor's
late wife, and natural love and affection was a factor in
the relationship of the parties. This was true also in Mannix
v. Baumgardner, where the plaintiff was the stepdaughter
of the decedent, and in Nichols v. Reed, where the plaintiff
had been reared as a son in the home of the promisor.
In the instant case, however, the plaintiff was merely
a former employee who rendered ordinary domestic serv-
ices and nothing further. Many cases have held that nurs-
ing, housekeeping, and domestic services, such as were here
involved, are capable of valuation in money, are in no way
peculiar or special in nature and do not constitute part
performance sufficient to justify specific performance of
alleged parole contracts to devise land."7
' 186 Md. 317, 321, 46 A. 2d 695, 697 (1946).
" See cases cited in Note, 101 A. L. R. 923, 1104 et 8eq. and of. Weaver v.
King, 184 Md. 283, 40 A. 2d 511 (1945) and Fitzpatrick v. Michael, 177 Md.
248, 9 A. 2d 639 (1939).
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